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Recent Case
NEGLIGENCE-PHYSICAL INJURY CAUSED BY
EMOTIONAL TRAUMA-RECOVERY POSSIBLE WHEN
PLAINTIFF WITNESSES ACCIDENT IN WHICH HER
INFANT DAUGHTER WAS KILLED BY
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENT ACT
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
The Supreme Court of California, in Dillon v. Legg," has held
that a plaintiff may recover damages for physical injuries caused
by emotional trauma suffered as a result of personally witnessing
an accident in which a close relative was seriously injured or killed
by the negligent act of the defendant. The majority2 expressly
overruled Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.8 which denied an
action for physical injuries predicated upon emotional trauma suf-
fered solely as a result of apprehending danger or witnessing in-
jury to a third person.
Plaintiff Margery M. Dillon alleged that the defendant so
negligently operated his vehicle as to cause it to collide with
plaintiff's infant daughter, Erin Lee, and that such negligence re-
sulted in injuries to Erin Lee which proximately caused her death.
1. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
2. The case was a four to three decision. Tobringer, J., wrote the
majority opinion, in which Peters, Mosk, and Sullivan, JJ., concurred.
Traynor, C.J., dissented for the reasons set forth in Amaya v. Home Ice,
Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
Burke, J., filed a separate dissenting opinion in which McComb, J., joined.
3. The important facts in Amaya were that the plaintiff was seven
months pregnant, was watching her seventeen-month-old son playing,
and was forced to stand helpless while she witnessed the defendants neg-
ligently strike him down with their truck. She alleged that she felt no




The complaint consisted of three separate causes of action, only
two of which are here relevant. The first alleged that Mrs. Dillon
was in close proximity to the accident and personally witnessed it.
As a result she "'sustained great emotional disturbance and shock
and injury to her nervous system' which caused her great physical
and mental pain and suffering. '4 In the second, a similar cause of
action was raised on behalf of the plaintiff's other infant daughter,
Cheryl, who was also in close proximity to the accident and wit-
nessed it personally.5
The defendant filed an answer and moved for judgment on the
pleadings as to both causes of action on the grounds that: "No
cause of action is stated in that allegation that plaintiff sustained
emotional distress, fright or shock induced by apprehension of
negligently caused injury to a third person."
The lower court granted the motion as to the mother's cause
of action, thereby dismissing her complaint, but denied it as to
the daughter's. The court found that Mrs. Dillon was not within
the zone of danger. Because of this fact, she could not allege
emotional shock resulting from fear for the safety of her own per-
son, and, therefore, did not state a good cause of action.
7
The defendant's subsequent motion for summary judgment as
to Cheryl's cause of action was denied because of conflicting testi-
mony as to the exact location of Cheryl8 in relation to the accident.
There was a "possibility that she was within such zone of danger
4. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at
74 (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 731-32, 441 P.2d at 914-15, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75 (quoting
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings).
7. The defendant relied on Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43,
319 P.2d 80 (1957), which held that a woman who suffered mental distress
and a miscarriage as a result of seeing a collision between the automobile
of a negligent defendant and her husband's automobile could not recover.
8. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant
filed the declaration of one McKinley, which disclosed that Mrs. Dillon
testified at her deposition that, when she saw the car rolling over Erin, she
noted that Cheryl was on the curb. Apparently, defendant also filed
Cheryl's own deposition, which contradicted Mrs. Dillon's statements re-
garding Cheryl's location. Plaintiff opposed defendant's motion as to
Cheryl's cause of action on the basis of this conflicting evidence:
Since the declarations filed by defendant are contradictory and
the testimony of Mrs. Dillon does not establish as a matter of law
that Cheryl Dillon was not in the zone of danger or had fear for
her own safety, plaintiff respectfully submits that the motion must
be denied.
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 732, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75 (quoting
plaintiff's brief on defendant's motion for summary judgment).
or feared for her own safety,"9 in which case she would be stating
a claim upon which recovery could be granted.
Mrs. Dillon appealed from the dismissal of her cause of action
thus confronting the supreme court squarely with the issue of
whether to extend the liability of a negligent defendant to physical
injuries resulting from the emotional trauma suffered by a plain-
tiff when he apprehends negligently caused danger or injury to a
third person, or witnesses such injury, without regard to whether
the plaintiff suffered impact, was within the zone of danger, or
feared for his own personal safety.
The court granted recovery for Mrs. Dillon. Dillon, however,
should not mean that recovery will be granted in every such
case. Dillon held that factually similar cases will, in the future, be
recognized and heard in court as a class instead of being auto-
matically barred by an arbitrary and unbending rule of law; but
only certain cases in the class will ultimately result in a recovery
by the plaintiff. The determination as to which cases will result
in liability and recovery will be made by applying "general guide-
lines,"10 set forth by the court and discussed infra, "to the specific
facts of the cases."'
11
Thus, the specific holding of Dillon, being strictly confined to
its facts, is that recovery can be granted to a mother who has
suffered physical injury as a result of the emotional trauma she
suffered upon personally witnessing an accident in which her in-
fant daughter was killed by the negligent act of the defendant.
Dillon is representative of a recent trend 12 toward the expan-
sion of liability in the area of negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress.1 This trend began with the recognition of mental distress
as an element of damages. However, recovery was limited by the
"impact" rule, which has been abandoned in a majority of juris-
dictions.14 More recent cases have held that a plaintiff within the
dzone of danger" may recover for physical injuries resulting from
the mental distress he suffered because of fear for the safety of
his own person.15 The American cases prior to Dillon unanimously
denied recovery when the plaintiff feared only for the safety of
some third person.1
6
9. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
10. Id. at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
11. Id.
12. It is not within the scope of this paper to present a detailed
description and analysis of the development of the law in the area of
negligent infliction of mental distress.
13. Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 103 (1959).
14. Id. at 143.
15. Id. at 148.
16. Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 220, 239 (1951). A brief summary of the lead-
ing California cases in the area of mental distress might be useful. In
Amaya, the court said that the "impact rule" had never been the law in
California. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 295 Cal. 2d at 299,
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The court in Dillon first disposed of a standard policy con-
sideration: the greatly increased possibility that fraudulent claims
of physical injury caused by mental distress would be advanced in
the future. The court said:
Indubitably juries and trial courts, constantly called
upon to distinguish the frivolous from the substantial and
the fraudulent from the meritorious, reach some erroneous
results. But such fallibility, inherent in the judicial proc-
ess, offers no reason for substituting for the case-by-case
resolution of causes an artificial and indefensible barrier.
Courts not only compromise their basic responsibility to de-
cide the merits of each case individually but destroy the
public's confidence in them by using the broad broom of
"administrative convenience" to sweep away a class of
claims a number of which are admittedly meritorious. The
mere assertion that fraud is possible, "a possibility
[that] exists to some degree in all cases," . . . does not
prove a present necessity to abandon the neutral prin-
ciples of foreseeability, proximate cause and consequential
injury that generally govern tort law.17
It is interesting to note that, in the Amaya case, decided in 1963,
this same court relied heavily upon the fraudulent claims con-
379 P.2d at 515, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 35. The court's authority for this state-
ment was a lower court decision, Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d 581, 92
P.2d 434 (1939), which relied, in turn, on the earlier supreme court deci-
sion of Sloane v. So. Cal. R.R., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896).
In Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918), it was held
that liability may be predicated upon fright and consequent illness induced
by the plaintiff's reasonable fear for her own safety, even when the plain-
tiff may also have feared for the safety of her children. Clough v. Steen,
3 Cal. App. 2d 392, 39 P.2d 889 (1934), presented a question closely related
to the one presented in Dillon. In that case, the plaintiff, her husband and
her minor child were involved in an automobile accident. The minor son
was killed, and the plaintiff sought to recover damages on the grounds that
the knowledge of her son's violent death caused her to suffer great mental
anguish and nervous shock. Recovery was denied. Two federal cases,
applying California law, reached similar results: Minkus v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 44 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Cal. 1942) (shock suffered by parents
when minor son found decomposed mouse in soft-drink bottle), and Maury
v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (parents present outside
their burning home with knowledge that their child was caught inside).
Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957), is similar to
Dillon factually. In that case plaintiff sat on her porch and watched de-
fendant's automobile collide with her husband's automobile. She suffered
extreme fright and a miscarriage. She was denied recovery because she
feared solely for her husband's safety and was not within the zone of
danger herself.
The last California case before Dillon to pass on this question was the
Amaya case, in which the supreme ourt affirmed the principle set down
by the appellate court in Reed.
17. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78, quoting Klein
v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 695, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962).
sideration in reaching a conclusion exactly opposite to that reached
in Dillon. In Amaya, the court felt that to impose liability would
"'open the way to fraudulent claims, and enter a field that has no
sensible or just stopping point.' "18
The majority in Dillon based its reasoning on the standard of
foreseeability: "'The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the
duty to be obeyed.' "19 Realizing that the foreseeability standard
has traditionally involved a "zone of danger" concept, the court
was careful to point out that some modern legal thinkers have ex-
panded the "zone" to include a plaintiff in Mrs. Dillon's position:
The concept of the zone of danger cannot properly be re-
stricted to the area of those exposed to physical injury;
it must encompass the area of those exposed to emotional
injury . . . [I]n awarding recovery for emotional shock
upon witnessing another's injury or death, we cannot draw
a line between the plaintiff who is in the zone of danger of
physical impact and the plaintiff who is in the zone of
danger of emotional impact.20
Having laid this foundation, the court set forth the general
guidelines to be used in determining whether the defendant could
have reasonably foreseen the injury suffered by the plaintiff and,
therefore, whether the defendant owed a legally cognizable duty
to the plaintiff:
In determining . . . whether defendant should reasonably
foresee the injury to the plaintiff, . . . the courts will take
into account such factors as the following: (1) Whether
plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as
contrasted with one who was a distance away from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional
impact upon the plaintiff from the sensory and contempor-
aneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learn-
ing of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3)
Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as
contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the pres-
ence of only a distant relationship.
21
In Amaya, the court had recognized that such guidelines as
those set forth above would be criticized as insufficiently defined
and would lead to something approaching limitless liability.
Another . . administrative factor to be weighed is the
problem of setting some limits to such liability for fright or
shock allegedly caused by the apprehension of danger or
injury not to the plaintiff but to a third person.
22
18. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d at 311, 379
P.2d at 522, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42, quoting Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603,
613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935).
19. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79, quoting Pals-
graf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
20. Dillon v. Legg, Id. at 920 n.5, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80 n.5. See 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1035-36 (1956).
21. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
22. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d at 312, 379
P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
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The court in Dillon, however, anticipated this criticism and sought
to meet it by showing that:
The courts have in the past, in analogous situations, drawn
the limits of liability, applying general guidelines such as
those above set forth to the specific facts of the cases. As
examples of that process of definition we set forth the
history of the "open car" cases, the rulings on recovery by
persons not in privity of contract for defendant's negligence
in drafting instruments, the decisions in the intentional
infliction of emotional injury, the modern English cases,
and some illustrative opinions that adjudicate the specific
issue before us.
28
After showing that the application of general guidelines to the
types of cases listed above has not resulted in limitless liability in
these areas, the court discussed the three English cases which were
the only authority cited in support of its decision. The court
seemed to feel that, if the English courts have been able to grant
recovery in cases like Dillon, while still placing reasonable
limitations on liability, American courts can do the same:
The fear of an inability to fix boundaries has not impelled
the courts of England to deny recovery for emotional
trauma caused by witnessing the death or injury of another
due to defendant's negligence. 24
The most important Engish case cited by the court is Ham-
brook v. Stokes Bros. 25 In that case, a servant of the defendant
left a truck parked at the top of a hill with the engine running.
A pregnant woman was walking her children to school and left them
at the street in which the truck was parked. The mother saw the
truck break loose and she feared for her children's safety. She
was never in danger herself and did not actually witness the
ensuing accident. Upon inquiry, she learned that one of her
children had been struck and had been seriously injured. Several
months later, both mother and foetus were dead. The trial court
held that the husband could not recover unless the decedent had
feared for her own personal safety. The appellate court reversed,
holding that recovery was warranted even if the mother's death
had resulted solely from fear for her children's death.
The court in Dillon also cited Chadwick v. British Rwys.
Board 6 and Boardman v. Sanderson. 7 In the former case, an
English court permitted recovery by the widow of a man who
23. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
24. Id. at 922, 69 Cal, Rptr. at 82.
25. [1925] 1 K.B. 141.
26. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 912.
27. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1317 (C.A.).
suffered severe nervous shock, not involving his own personal
safety, while serving as a rescuer at a gruesome train wreck. In
the latter case, a father and his young son had taken the family
automobile to a service station, had driven into it, and just
alighted. Through the negligence of a garage attendant, the boy's
foot was caught under one of the car's wheels. The father did not
see the accident and did not fear for his own safety. But upon
hearing his son's screams, he suffered mental shock for which the
court permitted him to recover.
In each of these English cases someone suffered emotional
trauma and neverous shock but did not contemporaneously fear for
his own safety. Two of the three cases, Hambrook and Boardman,
are analogous to Dillon in that they involve a parent who suffered
mental distress and resultant physical injuries because of fear for
the safety of his child. The Chadwick case falls into the category
of cases generally known as "rescuer" cases and is not, therefore,
truly analogous to Dillon.
2
It would appear that the majority was, perhaps, "embarking
upon a first excursion into the 'fantastic realm of infinite lia-
bility'. . ". .',2 Feeling that such a result would be an extreme in-
justice, the court labored to base its decision on sound legal prin-
ciples. The majority was particularly appalled by the seemingly
anomalous situation in which Cheryl, "who observed the accident,
would be granted recovery because she was in the 'zone of danger,'
but [Mrs. Dillon], not far distant would be barred from recovery."3 0
The dissent is largely a reiteration of the majority opinion in
the Amaya case. Although sympathizing with the plaintiff's plight,
the dissent offers that a line must be drawn somewhere which will
set a definite limit upon defendant's liability. It posits that the
majority's guidelines are so vague as to lead to infinite liability.
Another dissenting argument is that the majority's far-reaching lia-
bility is out of proportion to defendant's fault.
It is submitted that Amaya and the dissent in Dillon are based
on sounder legal reasoning than the majority opinion in Dillon for
several reasons. First, the Dillon court, and most other progres-
sively-minded courts, gave little consideration to the so-called
"floodgates" and "fraudulent claims" arguments. Yet, such consid-
erations cannot be safely rejected in all cases. At least one legal
writer has concluded that the possibility of maintenance of fraudu-
lent claims is a real one. The Amaya court cited this writer as
follows:
28. See p. 357 infra.
29. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d at 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (dissenting
opinion), quoting Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d at 315,
379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
30. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
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Dr. Smith reports on his study of 301 cases involving in-
juries allegedly caused by psychic stimuli, and concludes
(1) that a "majority of persons claiming injury from psychic
causes possessed sub-normal resistance to such stimuli";
(2) that "[i]n only 55 of the 301 cases surveyed could we
say actual causation was proven by a preponderance of sub-
stantial and credible evidence"; and (3) that hence "[t] he
skeptical courts were . . . correct in doubting whether ade-
quate criteria of proof existed in this field to make adminis-
tration of a remedy feasible. . . . Taking all cases decided
between 1850 and 1944 . . . . the net balance of justice
would have been greater had all courts denied damages
for injury imputed to psychic stimuli alone.31
Second, Dillon attempted to analogize the case before it to the
"open-car" cases and privity of contract cases. It is submitted that
this analogy is unsound. The court in Amaya agreed with this con-
clusion. In further rejecting an analogy between the "rescuer"
cases and the Dillon-Amaya situation, the dissent cited Professor
Fleming:
[T] here are weighty policy considerations which, in one
case, militate in favour and, in the other, against the plain-
tiff's claim to legal protection. Behind the ambivalence of
the foreseeability formula, there lies the desire, on the one
hand, to encourage altruistic action and, on the other, a de-
cided hesitation based on administrative grounds to permit
recovery for injury to the nervous system. Hence, no true
analogy is offered by decisions from one group of cases
which could be of assistance in the solution of a problem
falling within the other.
3 2
Third, the majority's "guidelines" are not sufficiently well-
defined to place any reasonable limitations on liability. Of these
guidelines, the dissent said:
Upon analysis, their seeming certainty evaporates into
arbitrariness, an [sic] inexplicable distinctions appear.
As we asked in Amaya: What if the plaintiff was hon-
estly mistaken in believing the third person to be in dan-
ger or to be seriously injured? . .. How "close" must
the relationship be between the plaintiff and the third per-
son? I.e., [sic] what if the third person was the plain-
tiff's beloved niece or nephew, grandparent, fiancee, or life-
long friend, more dear to the plaintiff than her immediate
family? Next, how "near" must the plaintiff have been to
31. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d at 311, 379 P.2d
at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43, quoting Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury
and Disease, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 303-06 (1944).
32. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d at 310 n.8,
379 P.2d at 522 n.8, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42 n.8, quoting J. FLEMING, TORTS
at 179 (1957).
the scene of the accident, and how "soon" must shock have
been felt? Indeed, what is the magic in plaintiff's being
actually present? Is the shock any less real if the mother
does not know of the accident until her injured child is
brought home? . . . No answers to these questions are to
be found in today's majority opinion. Our trial courts,
however, will not so easily escape the burden of distin-
guishing between litigants on the basis of such artificial
and unpredictable distinctions.
3 3
Fourth, the majority purported to apply the foreseeability
standard in Dillon and declared that it would be applied to similar
cases in the future. It is submitted, however, that the majority
did not make proper use of this standard. Briefly stated, the
guidelines set down by the majority are the plaintiff's nearness to
the accident, his sensory and contemporaneous observation of it, and
the relationship between the plaintiff and the injured party. As-
sume the following admittedly extreme, hypothetical. An aunt is
casually chatting with a neighbor and looking on while her infant
nephew and other young children are playing in the street. She is
from 150 to 200 feet away from the children. A negligent driver
recklessly enters the street unobserved by the aunt. The automo-
bile runs directly into the group of children, and the aunt suddenly
turns and observed the scene just at the moment of impact. She sees
bodies fly through the air and sees the wheels of the car run over
one child. She is positive that her nephew must be either seriously
injured or dead. As it turns out, her nephew had run to the curb to
retrieve a ball and had escaped injury completely. The child who
had been run over was killed instantly but was another neighbor-
hood child known only to the aunt as one of her nephew's play-
mates. The aunt, a woman of normal sensitivity, had feared so
greatly for her nephew's safety that she suffered a complete nervous
collapse. Subsequently, she is haunted by the memory of the car
striking the children and running over one child. As a result of the
emotional trauma, her nervous system is permanently damaged,
and she brings suit for damages in a California court. According
to the guidelines in Dillon, it seems fair to assume that the negligent
defendant would probably not be liable to the aunt. Yet, the de-
fendant in the Dillon case would be.
What is the different between the two situations? Why is the
defendant liable in one and not the other? The answer must be
that he owed a duty to one plaintiff but not to the other. Duty
depends on foreseeability, but foreseeability of what? It is at this
point that the majority may have misapplied the foreseeability
standard.
Dillon properly began its discussion by saying: "Since the
chief element in determining whether defendant owes an obligation




to plaintiff is the foreseeability of the risk, that factor will be of
prime concern in every case. '3 4 "Risk" is commonly defined as
being the chance that something will occur, in this case, the chance
that the defendant's negligence will injure someone. However, in
the next paragraph, the court made an important alteration in
this foreseeability standard: "In determining whether defendant
should reasonably foresee the injury to plaintiff, . . the courts
will take into account such factors as the following. . ... 35 The
standard, apparently, shifted from foreseeability of risk to fore-
seeability of injury, that is, from foreseeability of the chance that
plaintiff will be injured to foreseeability of the injury itself.
The court's own examples illustrate the difference between
the two standards. "[O]bviously defendant is more likely to fore-
see that a mother3 6 who observed an accident affecting her child
will suffer harm than to foretell that a stranger witness will do
so.' '3 This is indisputable if one assumes, as the court did, that the
defendant has already foreseen the risk involved and, somehow,
knows that someone is watching and also knows whether that per-
son is the child's mother or a stranger. The court also stated that:
"The defendant is more likely to foresee that shock to the near-
by, witnessing mother will cause physical harm than to anticipate
that someone distant from the accident will suffer more than
a temporary reaction."3 8 Here again, the court has already assumed
that a reasonable-man defendant would have foreseen that a "near-
by, witnessing mother," instead of a distant, non-witnessing
stranger, was present. Neither of these statements were concerned
with the foreseeability of risk.
The court, in effect, would tailor the foreseeability standard to
the facts of each case. There is, for example, a plaintiff, such as
Mrs. Dillon, who alleges that she stood in close proximity to the ac-
cident and personally watched her daughter being struck down.
Once these facts are brought out, the court then decides that the de-
34. Id. at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (emphasis added).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. The court in Dillon says: "Surely the negligent driver who
causes the death of a young child may reasonably expect that the mother
will not be far distant. . . ." 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 91. Every-
day experience might suggest a different conclusion. When one considers
the hundreds of children that play in, or in the vicinity of, heavily-travelled
streets, especially in urban areas, it is incomprehensible that the mother of
each child is in the immediate vicinity, much less within eyeshot. Thus, it
is not always safe to say that one can always, or even most of the time,
reasonably expect that a child's mother will not be far distant.
37. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
38. Id.
fendant could have reasonably foreseen her injury. On the other
hand, a plaintiff such as the aunt in our hypothetical cannot recover.
Since she was only the child's aunt and was not immediately upon
the scene of the accident, or that her apprehension of injury to
her nephew was mistaken, her own injury, although just as real as
Mrs. Dillon's, is not compensable because not foreseeable by the de-
fendant.
It is submitted that if the foreseeability of risk standard is
properly applied, either both plaintiffs should recover, or neither
should. The risk involved in such a situation is that someone,
anyone, will witness the defendant's negligent act, or even hear of
it, and as a result will suffer mental distress or physical injury, or
both. Once the court declares this risk to be foreseeable by the
reasonable man, a defendant should be liable to anyone who was,
in fact, present and who suffered a real injury, or to anyone at all
who suffered injury as a result of his act. The English cases cited
by the court in Dillon seem to apply the foreseeability standard in
this way. In Hambrook the mother who did not actually witness
an injury to her children but only heard of it later was not treated
any differently than the parent in Boardman who was right on the
scene.
What Dillon really accomplished was a major policy change in
the law of California. Amaya struck at the heart of the matter
when it said that a duty to a plaintiff exists when the legislature
or the courts say one exists.39 If the court in Dillon wished to
change policy and say that, defendants now owe a legally recog-
nizable duty to plaintiffs in Mrs. Dillon's situation, it should have
simply said so and not purported to base its decision on foresee-
ability. The court was, of course, reluctant to do so because such
a decision would pave the way for liability for all consequences of a
negligent act, no matter how remote. It attempts, therefore, to
exclude liability for remote consequences by using the foreseea-
bility standard.
The dissent recognized that the imposition of liability in Dillon
and similar cases would be out of proportion to the defendant's
fault:
The answers must be reached by balancing the social in-
terests involved in order to ascertain how far defendant's
duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently be ex-
tended. It is our conclusion that they can neither justly
nor expediently be extended to any recovery for physical
injuries sustained by one out of the range of ordinary phys-
ical peril as a result of the shock of witnessing another's
danger. Such consequences are so unusual and extra-
ordinary, viewed after the event, that a user of the high-
way may be said not to subject others to an unreasonable
39. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 295 Cal. 2d at 309, 379
P.2d at 521, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
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risk of them by the careless management of his vehicle.
Furthermore, the liability imposed is wholly out of pro-
portion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor, would
put an unreasonable burden upon users of the highway,
open the way to fraudulent claims, and enter a field that
has no sensible or just stopping point.
40
It is difficult to accurately appraise the future impact of the
Dillon case. The California Supreme Court has by virtue of its
decision entered upon heretofore untrodden ground. One reason-
able prediction is that the trial courts of the state will bear the onus
of making practical application of the somewhat artificial and ill-
defined standards laid down in Dillon. When the courts of Cali-
fornia are forced to apply these standards to factual situations
which must inevitably differ from the facts presented in Dillon, it
is quite possible that they will be led to impose liability upon a
defendant for the most remote consequences of his negligence. This
liability may be totally unwarranted by his culpability.
KARL ALEXANDER
40. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d at 927, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (dissenting
opinion), quoting Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497,
501 (1935).

